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TRADEMARK LICENSING AND VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS IN FRANCHISING
ARRANGEMENTS
J.AZZEs M. TREECE t
I
Franchising, a method of distribution increasingly utilized by
businesses and scrutinized by agencies of government, provides cor-
porations with control over access to distribution channels and control
over the business practices of franchisees-dealers and distributors-
in those channels.' The franchisor can control access of distributors to
a distribution channel by selectively choosing outlets for its products;
it can control access of manufacturers to a distribution channel by
controlling, through contract or coercion, the nature of the inventory
of its franchisees. The franchisor can also force its will upon franchisees
in such matters as pricing, advertising, merchandising, selling and
hiring. It can, in short, restrict the freedom of structurally inde-
pendent economic units to make decisions concerning basic business
problems.
Franchising relationships generally raise problems of both anti-
trust and trademark policy. Some franchising relationships fit the
model for vertical restraints of trade as, for example, when the fran-
chisor dictates the pricing policies of the franchisee. This form of
restraint is thought to be as harmful to competition as a horizontal
price fixing agreement between competing manufacturers or dis-
tributors. On the other hand, many franchising agreements are parts
of a wide system for the distribution of goods and services under a
single trademark. Consumers expect to find identical services, products
and prices whenever they see the trade symbol-a result which can
only be attained by control of the franchisees from above. The sug-
gestion is sometimes made that the legal limits of franchisee control
t B.S. 1959, M.A. 1962, LL.B. 1961, University of Illinois. Associate Professor
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1 In the past several years, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided
cases challenging the legality of attempts by Sealy Corporation and the White Motor
Company to control by contract the marketing area of franchised dealers, United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) ; White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253 (1963) ; by General Motors to control by contract the location of its fran-
chised dealers' places of business, United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S.
127 (1966) ; and by the Atlantic Refining Company to control by coercion the sources
of tires, batteries and accessories carried by its retail service station dealers. Atlantic
Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
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should be determined, not merely by antitrust policy, but by trademark
policy as well. This suggestion implies the existence of a general prin-
ciple which would restrain action otherwise dictated by antitrust con-
siderations in deference to trademark policy.
This article is concerned exclusively with trademark considera-
tions. Its goal is to explore the rationale for permitting the use of
trademarks in a competitive economy, for encouraging the transfer
of trademarks and for countenancing their licensing or franchising.
The article will attempt to lay a foundation for assessing the validity
of the proposition that, in some situations, action dictated by antitrust
principles must be stayed due to considerations of trademark policy.
The antitrust solutions to the problem of vertical restraints in fran-
chising are left for other commentators.
II
Consider the many decisions confronting a consumer with a
limited amount of money to spend. He must choose between recreation
and investment, weigh education against creature comforts and balance
security against adventure.2 If he allocates money for recreation, he
must choose between the present and the future, between Miami and
Europe, between the theatre and the cabaret. In buying food he must
spend for milk or wine, bread or cake, fish or fowl. If he buys razor
blades, he must choose between stainless and plain, foreign and
domestic, patented and unpatented, plastic-coated and oil-filmed,
advertised and un-advertised, double-edged and single-edged, dispenser-
packed and paper-wrapped, high-priced and low-priced.
The consumer's task is to allocate dollars among thousands of
transaction opportunities so that his satisfactions are maximized. But
a consumer never can consider more than a small number of possi-
bilities and, at the time of purchase, never really can know very much
about the satisfaction he will get from a particular can of tomatoes, for
example, since he cannot open the can in the supermarket aisle.
Perhaps the consumer's best course of action is to develop
strategies to reduce the number of choices 3 and then to make selections
2 "The man who buys a pint of whiskey today does not know to what degree he
prejudices his son's college education 20 years hence." Bauer, Consumer Behavior
as Risk Taking, in PROCEEDINGS, 43RD NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE AmmucAN
MARKETING ASSOCIATION 389-90 (R. Hancock ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as Bauer].
3 In a supermarket shopping test, selected consumers were asked to make pur-
chases in twenty different categories of products and were instructed to select the
package in each category which offered the greatest quantity for the money. Each
consumer was given plenty of time to make selections, but was not permitted to use
paper, pencil or calculating device. The results suggest that the typical supermarket
shopper spends about nine per cent more than a hypothetical consumer who always
selects the most economical package. Friedman, Consumer -Confusion In the Selection
of Supermarket Products, 50 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 529 (1966). The failure of
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from the narrowed field by relying on past experience and present
expectations. Thus he initially might narrow his choice by focusing
only on items carrying familiar trademarks or trade names. He then
might make his final selection on the supposition that a particular
product will be acceptable because it is produced or distributed by a
firm which has produced acceptable products in the past.
4
In order to use expectations profitably in making purchasing de-
cisions, the consumer must be provided with a symbol which will signal
that a particular product is connected with a particular reputation. He
also must have some assurance that the trade symbol will continue to
represent the same production and distribution system which has been
either satisfactory or unsatisfactory in the past. This assurance has
been provided by giving firms a right to the exclusive use of their trade
symbols. Presumably the concern of firms for the continuing patronage
of their customers will provide the incentive to maintain standards of
quality for goods sold under a particular trademark.
Consumers, as well as businesses, are concerned with brand
loyalty. Consumers have an important interest in the general prac-
tice of returning to the place or product that previously served them
well, as a means of striking a balance between the need to conserve
time and energy in the market place and the goal of making a sensible
allocation of financial resources.5 People might approach purchasing
decisions without relation to past experiences, by testing the merits of
each item or by concentrating on price alone and assuming that
quality differentials will not be extensive. Nevertheless, the number
of choices, the limits of time and the difficulties involved in weighing
quality at the point of purchase make both reasonable and useful a
system which provides consumers with a means of associating
presently-tendered products with past experiences. 6
In such a system, a firm's trademark can be put to different
uses by different consumers, and the same consumer can make
the consumers tested by Friedman to make the best selections within the twenty
categories specified emphasizes the difficulties consumers generally face in making
purchasing decisions involving hundreds of outlets, thousands of categories and many
variables in addition to price and quantity.4 Bauer reports that one of his associates interviewed a woman consumer who
expressed a preference for small shops because she thought that the proprietor of a
small shop reduced the complexity of her purchasing decisions by reducing the number
of brands confronting her and by (hopefully) weeding out the least preferable.
Bauer 396-97.
5 Although consumers do develop buying habits based on trademarks or "brands,"
the likelihood that past purchasing patterns will be repeated seldom approaches
certainty. Any particular choice appears to be related to the last choice, the last
several choices and the elapsed time since the last choice. Kuehn, Consumer Brand
Choice as a Learning Process, J. ADVEPTISING RESEARCH, Dec. 1962, at 10. See also
Frank, Brand Awareness as a Probability Process, 35 J. Bus. 43 (1962); Kanungo
& Dutta, Brand Awareness as a Function of Its Meaningfulness, Sequential Position
and Product Utility, 50 3. AsP'inm PsYcHoLoGY 220 (1966).
6 See Bauer 391.
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different uses of different marks. A mark can be used either to
economize the effort of decision making or to reduce risks where the
consumer's information is inadequate or the consequences of his action
incalculable.7 Where the purchase decision involves a complex, high-
priced, untried or possibly injurious product, the consumer is likely
to make some use of the source symbol to reduce his risks. For
example, an average person who wishes to purchase a diamond will
surely prefer to deal with Tiffany's than with a stranger offering a
"good buy" on some "interesting jewelry" in Central Park.
However, if the product is a common and simple household item
such as sugar, it is unlikely that consumers will rely on a trademark
as a means of reducing risks. Consumer loyalty to a brand of sugar,
if it exists at all, will be a function of choice reduction rather than
risk reduction.
Of course, consumers need not utilize marks at all in making
purchases. Consumers can test some products themselves and can
get information about particular products from many sources. For
some very high-risk decisions, some consumers probably would be
unwilling to rely consciously on a trademark to reduce risk, preferring
to check and test themselves; in some low-risk situations, some con-
sumers doubtless would be unwilling to rely consciously on a trade-
mark to reduce choices, preferring instead to focus on price. In
general, however, it can be expected that most consumers will make
some use of trademarks in most purchasing situations to reduce choices,
to reduce risks or for both purposes.
Consumers not only make various uses of marks, but also vary
in the way they perceive "the source" of a product. It seems likely
that sometimes trademarks will be associated with a general reputation
for quality and sometimes with a specific production process assumed
to have a particular relation to quality.' "General quality" connotations
might include: "this product bears the same mark as products of the
7 Product source is usually a very important factor in high risk decisions. See,
e.g., Bauer, Risk Handling in Drug Adoption: The Role of Company Preference,
25 PUB. OPINION Q. 546 (1961). There is some evidence that professional buyers
discount source in high risk situations more than others, including well-educated,
technically informed consumers. See T. LEvITTr, INDUSTRIAL PURCHASING BEHAVIOR:
A STUDY OF COMMJUNICATIONS EFFECTS 90-91, 108-09 (1965). Starbuck & Bass, An
Experimental Study of Risk-Taking and the Value of Information in. a New Product
Context, 40 J. Bus. 155 (1967), make the point that the availability of information
significantly improves the quality of the manufacturer's decision to introduce a new
product. It seems clear that the availability of information that a particular source
has performed well in the past will improve the quality of the consumer's purchasing
decision.
8 While the effect of source varies among purchasers and with the degree of risk
involved, it quite clearly has a massive impact in the real world. People do tend to
patronize sources they perceive as trustworthy. Levitt, supra note 7, at 31, 71-72,
146, 162.
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same type which gave me satisfaction before;" 9 "this product bears
the same mark as products of a different type which gave me satis-
faction before;" " this product bears a mark which I have seen ad-
vertised and about which I have heard nothing adverse;" "this product
bears a mark long known to my family or friends as the mark of a
firm with relatively stable and acceptable practices, policies, traditions,
values and goals." "x "Specific" quality connotations might include:
"this product was made by X individual;" "this product came from a
plant located at X place;" 12 "this product contains X ingredient;" or
"this product was made according to X formula." "3
Of course, neither the specific quality nor the general quality list
is exhaustive. A consumer might make no more use of a mark than
to assume that, within each product line, all products presently con-
fronting him bearing the same mark are uniform in quality. Or, on
the other hand, he might go so far as to assume that because the
words of a mark which he has never seen before have for him a
quality connotation-Blue Ribbon, Gold Seal, A-i-a product bearing
that mark is of acceptable quality.
Neither of these consumer assumptions is generally a useful
means of making either efficient or risk-reducing purchasing decisions.
Consumers must be willing, at times, to presume that the product of
a firm is acceptable on the ground that the firm has in the past
produced another product acceptable to themselves or others.
III
A trademark can continue to remind consumers of past con-
sumption experiences despite changes in the ownership, management
or control of a particular firm, and the needs of consumers can be
served by the continued use of the mark in the market place, regardless
of changes in the fortunes of the men-owners, managers and
workers-through whom the firm accomplishes its tasks. Even simple,
1 See Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing,
72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1188-89 (1963).
10 See Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44 HAv. L. Rxv. 1210, 1220 (1931);
cf. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols,
57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1187-89 (1948).
"1 This last example clearly fits into the "general" list, but it also suggests that
a consumer reacting in that way has specific information about a particular firm-a
firm he has 'humanized."
That consumers "humanize" firms seems clearly established. See, e.g., Spector,
Basic Dimensions of the Corporate Image, 25 J. MAERXING, Oct. 1967, at 47. Con-
sumers also form childhood preferences for particular firms which exert considerable
influence upon later purchasing behavior. See Guest, Brand Loyalty Revisited: A
Twenty-Year Report, 48 J. APPLIE PsYcoLoGY 93 (1964).
12 See Grismore, The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Nanes, 30 Micia. L.
REv. 489, 494 (1932).
13 Id.
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individually owned firms have a potential existence in the market place
which is independent of the life span of the proprietor. Joseph Ingels,
a 19th century Indiana enterpreneur, provides an example.14
Ingels made and sold grain drills under the trademark HOOSIER
from 1857 to 1876. Letters patent protected portions of the drills
after 1863, and gave them a certain distinction which apparently was
found desirable by more than twenty thousand customers during the
firm's nineteen-year tenure in the market. Moreover, the identifying
symbol HOOSIER had a memory value which, when coupled with
the reputed performance characteristics of drills bearing the mark, gave
assurance that at any point in time HOOSIER drills would attract
consumers for an additional period of time.
In 1876, probably for reasons of health, Joseph Ingels stopped
doing business and, early in 1877, perhaps realizing that his disability
would prevent him from resuming, he transferred his rights in the
unexpired patents and in the trademark HOOSIER to another. The
goodwill symbolized by the trademark HOOSIER continued to exist
after 1876, when Ingels withdrew from the market place; at the time
he stopped production and transferred the patents and trademark,
there were consumers willing to rely on the mark HOOSIER as a
guide to purchasing a drill.
Though one might assume that in most cases the retirement of
the owner of a "one man business" would have more of an impact on
the policies and practices of the firm than would the retirement of a
large corporation's executive, much can be said from the consumer's
point of view for permitting Ingel's transferee to take up and use the
HOOSIER mark. Since the transfer of marks with the transfer of
businesses saves consumers the effort of keeping track of a changing
pattern of symbols for product markets, the transfer of the mark
HOOSIER presumably saved consumers from learning a new calculus
of symbols for the drill field. There is, of course, a chance for dashed
expectations when new owners use old marks, but if a basic goal is to
provide consumers with symbols as devices for saving energy in the
market place, then permitting owners of marks to transfer them with
the business contributes to the energy-saving capacity of the system
as a whole.
In the HOOSIER example, the matter of succession of owners
would have been immaterial to consumers for whom the mark had a
general quality connotation, if Ingels had transferred patents, marks,
plant and equipment. The source to be rewarded or avoided then
would have been unchanged despite the change in ownership, and it
14 The saga of Joseph Ingels can be gleaned from Julian v. Hoosier Drill Co.,
78 Ind. 408 (1881).
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reasonably could be expected that in the period shortly after the
transfer, consumers' expectations would be as likely to be served by a
HOOSIER drill made by Ingels' successor as by a drill made by Ingels.
The transfer of trademarks is convenient, although not essential
to the functioning of the market place. While the successor could be
required to enter the market under his own symbol, permitting him to
market drills under the old mark provides many consumers with easy
access to the product of the firm which they prefer to patronize.
Indeed, the case of Joseph Ingels provides a relatively difficult
test for a policy favoring transferability of marks. As ownership of
business becomes dispersed and as ownership of the mark is seen as
lodged in the firm rather than in the owners of the firm, it becomes
easier to see the continuity of the firm and to support a policy of per-
mitting marks to continue functioning as source symbols despite turn-
overs in ownership interests in the firm.
The Stillman-Carmichael partnership, which did business in
Rhode Island in the 187 0's, provides another example. In 1871 one
partner died and three of the remaining five partners bought his
interest. Later one of the remaining partners bought out the others
and, after continuing the business for four years, sold it and the mark,
STILLMAN & CO., to a different firm, containing no members of
the old firm. The purchaser continued making the same product,
linseys, at the same quality, but at a different mill.
The Rhode Island court held that the new firm was entitled to use
the mark of its predecessor, as the successor to its business." The
transfers of interest among the original, partners in the old firm were
not thought to cast any doubt upon the propriety of the continued use
by either the old or new firm of the mark originated by the first
Stillman-Carmichael partnership. The court perceived that since the
new firm had succeeded the old one, use by the new firm of the old
firm's mark contributed to, rather than detracted from, order in the
market place.
The idea of succession seems to be vital to the conclusion that
transfer of marks is appropriate, for transfer of the mark to one who
has not succeeded to "the business" gives rise to potential confusion in
the market place. Where a brewing company liquidates its business,
for example, selling the real estate to A, the equipment to B and the
trademark to C,'6 it seems safe to assume that C's use of the old mark
will mislead those consumers relying on the mark as a guide to pur-
chasing decisions, because the product bearing the mark, coming from
15 A. Carmichel & Co. v. Latimer, Stillman & Co., 11 R.I. 395, 401-02 (1876).
16 Cf. LaFayette Brewery, Inc. v. Rock Island Brewing Co., 87 F.2d 489 (C.C.
P.A. 1937).
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a firm having no continuing link with the former mark user, will not
have the supposed relationship with past consumption experiences.
Traffic in trade symbols unconnected to underlying goodwill is
unacceptable, not only because it leads to confusion, but because it
leads to confusion which courts, keying as they do, only on cases and
controversies, are ill-equipped to eliminate. But the consumer can
benefit where a transfer of mark ownership accompanies and is inci-
dental to a change in control of all of the assets of a firm. One might
even argue that in cases where succession is dear, failure to transfer
the mark would be inappropriate, both because a continued use of the
mark by the transferor of the business would deceive consumers and
a complete withdrawal of the mark from use by anyone would in-
convenience them.
Courts are disposed to measure the legality of mark transfers by
analyzing the function of the mark before and after the transfer.
Professor Grismore long ago noted this instinct of the courts for a
functional analysis, suggesting that a mark transfer is good, regardless
of the quantum of tangibles accompanying the transfer, if the mark
connotes the same thing to consumers after the transfer as before.y
Of course hard cases remain. Often a mark means different
things to different consumers. As applied to cologne, for example, the
mark 4711 may mean "cologne with this mark gave me satisfaction
before" to some; it may mean, at the same point in time, "cologne with
this mark was made according to a secret formula developed in
Germany" to others. In the 1920's, two firms asserted rights in the
mark 4711, then famous for cologne: Firm 1 succeeded to all of the
assets of the firm which developed 4711 cologne, except the secret
formula for producing the cologne; Firm 2 succeeded to the secret
formula, but not to equipment, plant, inventory or personnel.' 8
It may have been that Firm 1 could produce a cologne enough
like the old product so that customers with general expectations about
quality, not based on knowledge of a secret formula, would get what
they expected. It also may have been true that consumers for whom
the formula was important would find their expectations defeated
even if Firm l's cologne was the laboratory equivalent of the cologne
made with the secret formula.
Presumably problems such as the one in the 4711 case do not
arise often enough to cast doubt upon the general policy favoring long
service in the market place for marks having general quality con-
notations for most consumers. Perhaps fact patterns like that in the
7 Grismore, supra note 12, at 494-503.
is See Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd. Muelhens, Inc., 43 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1930).
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4711 case can be dealt with by casting the burden upon one challenging
the transfer to show that, for a substantial number of consumers, the
mark as used by the successor firm misrepresents the nature of the
product bearing it. Perhaps rights and remedies can be made to
depend on the court's judgment about the number of consumers served
and disserved by the new use of the old mark.
The divestiture of a department, division or subsidiary by a
complex, multi-function firm probably poses the most recurring threat
of injury to consumer expectations in the present economy. If firm
X produces a raw material that it sells under mark A and a finished
product that it sells under mark B, it may choose, for one reason or
another, to divest itself of either the raw material business or the
product line. Since some consumers who have purchased a raw
material marked A or an end product marked B will have an interest
in returning to or avoiding raw material A or end product B in the
future, their interest will be served if firm X disposes of the mark along
with the part of the business sold. 9
If one assumes that few consumers were aware that firm X did
business under both mark A and mark B, then there is no potential for
harm to consumer source associations when firm X divests itself of one
of its lines accompanied by the mark, since thereafter few consumers
will suppose that a connection exists between the quality of raw
material A and the quality of end-product B. If firm X is the General
Electric Company, however, and it divests itself of its light bulb
business accompanied by the right to control the use of the General
Electric symbol in the light bulb field, while retaining rights in the
mark in other fields, there will be great potential for consumer con-
fusion. The General Electric symbol probably has strong, specific
source connotations for the many consumers who know that the
General Electric Company operates in many product and service
markets. It also may be assumed that the General Electric Company
is aware of these trademark connotations, and that it therefore would
be unwilling to entrust control of its mark to one who, by activity
in the light bulb market, might devalue the mark in those markets
where it is still controlled and used by General Electric. In these two
cases, the consumer interest is best served if firm X accompanies the
transfer of its raw material business or product line with a transfer
of rights in the appropriate mark and, if General Electric, in with-
drawing from the light bulb field, does not transfer rights in the General
Electric symbol to the successor firm.
V)See Canadian Club Beverage Co. v. Canadian Club Corp., 268 Mass. 561, 168
N.E. 106 (1929); cf. Tetra Pak Co. v. Schneider, 125 U.S.P.Q. 460 (Tm. T. &
A. Bd. (1960); Witthaus v. Braun, 44 Md. 303 (1876). See also R. DOLF., TER.4-
TORA, TApEuAI& RiGnTS AN) THE AWTrMTjST LAWS 94 (1965).
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As a practical matter the self-interest of enlightened businessmen
usually can be depended upon to coincide with the interest of con-
sumers in maintaining orderly markets. In cases like those discussed
above, it can be assumed that the mark owner's evaluation of the impact
of the proposed mark transfer upon future relations with customers of
its undivested lines will contribute significantly to the decision to
transfer or not to transfer the trademark along with the assets.
The businessman's desire to develop and retain loyal customers
can also be depended upon to safeguard consumers from fraud or
deception when A sells his entire business to B. There is, in such a
case, danger that B will abandon A's standards, put out a shoddy
product, exploit customers who rely on A's mark until it no longer
symbolizes A's former goodwill and then terminate the business. But
this rarely occurs-perhaps because B will have paid too much for A's
goodwill to risk short-run exploitation and, perhaps, because acquiring
a firm with brand-loyal customers, by definition, involves the kind of
investment that requires the participation of men or institutions not
motivated toward exploitation, even in the long run."° Although the
consumer who relies on marks as indicators of quality always runs the
risk that the product purchased will have been downgraded inten-
tionally by the producer, reported instances of cases involving quality
change in trademarked products are few."' The main point, however,
is not that producers seldom defraud consumers by sudden and
substantial changes in the quality of trademarked products, but that
2OSee 3. GALBRAiTH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 108-78 (1967); Galbraith,
Market Planning and the Role of Government: The New Industrial State II, 219
THE AThANTIC, May, 1967, at 69. Professor Berle has suggested that businessmen
understand that the transfer of control of a firm carries with it an ethical duty to share-
holders, labor, consumers and management on the part of the seller "to assure himself
that his successors conform . . . to minimum standards of character and responsi-
bility." Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 CoLumr. L. REv. 1212, 1220 (1958).
21 Doubtless the number of reported cases does not reflect the number of instances
of change in quality, since both consumers and competitors are unlikely to sue-con-
sumers because litigation is seldom worth the trouble and competitors because it is
difficult for them to state a cause of action.
The FTC can and does police such conduct. In Royal Baking Powder Co. v.
FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922), the court affirmed an order declaring that use of
a brand name identified with cream of tartar baking powder on phosphate baking
powder was an unfair method of competition. In Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318
F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1963), the FTC ordered defendant to cease authorizing the use
of the word "Waltham" on watches imported from abroad, except with the disclaimer
"not manufactured by Waltham Watch Co. of Massachusetts." The FTC felt that con-
sumers would be deceived (and competitors disadvantaged) if a mark made famous
by over 100 years of use on watches made in Massachusetts was suddenly applied
to watches of German origin.
The courts also police conduct resulting in quality changes. An alternative holding
in Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448 (D.N.J. 1910), was that
plaintiff forfeited whatever mark rights it had by changing the basic ingredient in
its baking powder from alum to phosphate. In Renaud Sales Co. v. Davis, 22 F.
Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1938), modified, 104 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1939), a plaintiff was
deemed not entitled to the aid of equity in policing its mark rights, because it had
diluted its product. It began selling 3/4 oz. of perfume for 39 , where before it had
sold 1 oz. for $10.
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the incidence of such occurrences would seem not to be related signif-
icantly to transfers of control of firms.
IV
A major problem of quality control of trademarked products is
created by the fact that a product will often contain parts manufactured
by a sub-contractor with whom the mark owner's relations are only
contractual.2" Such situations are similar to the case of the mark-
owning retailer who has a relatively stable relationship with his
sources of supply.' The mark-owning retailer can control the nature
and quality of the supplied goods by enforcing the terms of his con-
tract; he presumably will use his supply contracts to provide consumers
with goods of constant quality and thus make his mark a reliable
vehicle for making purchasing decisions.
22 "... [O]rigin is not limited to the actual manufacture of every constituent
element of the trade-marked article." American Thermos Bottle Co. v. W. T. Grant
Co., 279 F. 151, 156 (D. Mass. 1922). Firms often contract out to independent units
some of the functions involved in manufacturing the entire product. A random group
of labor cases, in which a dispute arose due to subcontracting while a union agreement
was in effect, indicates the breadth of subcontracting activities: delivery service,
Alan Wood Steel Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 722 (1965); packaging, Kaiser Alum. & Chem.
Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 307 (1964) ; manufacturing, United States Steel Corp., 44 Lab.
Arb. 317 (1965) ; repair work, Kennecott Copper Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 1653 (1964) ;
and maintenance services, UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962).
At one time the vacuum bottle marketed under the well-known THERMOS
trademark consisted of a container made in Germany and a filler from Japan, com-
bined in the United States, sold under the label "made at Norwich" and marketed
under the slogan "American-made goods for American people keep American work-
men busy." See American Thermos Bottle Co. v. W. T. Grant Co., supra at 157-58.
Many of the components of complex items such as automobiles or airplanes are
manufactured for the mark owner by independent sources. Much of the annual
tooling effort in the auto industry is conducted not by the auto firms themselves, but
by independent local shops. See W. PATON & R. DIxoN, MAEx-oR-BuY DECIsIokS
IN TOOLING FOR MASS PRODUCTION (1961) (Mich. Bus. Rep. No. 35). Parts ranging
from finishes and fabrics, see, e.g., United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586 (1957), to crank shafts and tires, see, e.g., C. EDWARDS, DYNAMICS OF THE
UNITE STATES AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 149-69, 251-53 (1965); G. MEANS, PRICING
PowE AND THE PUnBLIC INTEREST 198-207 (1962), are contracted out to various
independent sources.
In the airplane industry, the primary manufacturers contract out the manufacture
of such items as aircraft bolts, plexiglass, plastic knobs, fire control systems, landing
gear apparatus and fuselage sections, see, J. DAY, SUBCONTRACTING POLICY IN THE
AIRFRAME INDUSTRY 117, 120-40, 148-53 (1956), and they contract both with com-
panies having a permanent connection with the primary company and with the industry
and with temporary sources-job shops having in some cases but a fleeting relation
with either the primary company or the air frame industry. Id. at 32-33, 116.
In retailing, as is well known, mark owners performing only a marketing function
buy canned goods, HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1966) ;
dairy products, FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966); auto supplies, Atlantic
Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965), rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965);
liquor, Ph. Schneider Brewing Co. v. Century Distilling Co., 107 F.2d 699 (10th
Cir. 1939) ; clothing, Rosen v. Furmbilt Stores, Inc., 103 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1939) ;
tobacco products, Witthaus v. Braun, 44 Md. 303 (1876); record players, H. H.
Scott, Inc. v. Annapolis Electroacoustic Corp., 195 F. Supp. 208 (D. Md. 1961);
shoes, United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950), and scores of other items
from manufacturers; these mark owners impress their mark upon the goods.
2 3 See, e.g., Witthaus v. Braun, 44 Md. 303 (1876).
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The process by which the mark owner gets goods bearing
his mark to the point of purchase is an integrated process of assembly
which he controls, either directly as owner-employer or indirectly as
contractor-purchaser. To both the mark owner and the consumer, the
plant of each sub-contractor with whom the mark owner deals becomes,
in effect, one of the departments whose efforts are coordinated to
produce a finished, trademarked product.'
For the consumer, the fact that a mark owner may do business
without ownership control over all of the factors of production means
that the source represented by the mark is not a single, static, legal
entity. Instead it is a changing complex of legal and personal rela-
tions. 5 But this does not impede the consumer in his use of source
symbols as aids in making purchasing decisions. In fact, for most
purchasing decisions the consumer does not care about the organization
chart of the firm or firms which brought the product to market. He
knows-although he does not think of it-that firms have turnovers
in personnel, change raw material sources and award subcontracts.2"
The consumer wants a product for which there is a reasonable ex-
pectation that present quality will be like the quality of past products
bearing the same mark. A reasonable expectation of consistent quality
is possible if the business using the mark has sufficient cohesiveness and
continuity of purpose to give it a nexus with the past and the future.
The concept of source seems broad enough to include situations
where the trademark owner exercises quality control at the end of
a procedure in which important manufacturing functions have been
delegated to other independent firms, since it is realistic to view the
other firms as departments in a loosely organized venture coordinated
by the mark owner. Where the finished products come within the
physical control of the mark owner before they are offered to con-
sumers, it is unimportant whether the various units contributing to
the product are contract-controlled or ownership-controlled. The mark
owner quite reasonably can be regarded as the source under either
form of organization. The concept of source is also broad enough to
2 4 See, e.g., G. ANYON, MANAGING AN INTEGRATED PURCHASING PROCESs 96
(1963).
25 This dynamic source is not, in fact, without responsibility. If it comes to
that, the law will point to someone whom the consumer can hold for injury-causing
defects in the marketing or production processes. And common sense suggests that
consumers can, in addition, hold such multi-unit "sources" responsible for defeated
expectations by thereafter avoiding products bearing the offending trademark.
26Cf. Bostitch Trademark, [1963] R.P.C. 183 (Ch. 1963), a case involving a
challenge to an American firm's marketing program in England, in which Justice Lloyd-
Jacob pointed out that neither the British Trademark Act nor general principles of
trademark law requires the mark owner to refrain from varying manufacturing or
marketing procedures. The Justice observed that a mark owner may move his plant
from one place to another, change subcontractors or arrange for final assembly by
someone of his choice.
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embrace arrangements where independent firms perform functions
which influence product quality after the product has left the mark
owner's premises and is thus beyond the physical control of the
managers and employees of the mark-owning firm. Theoretically,
under such a concept of source, the community of firms involved will
probably have a similar interest in the long run quality and success of
the product, regardless of their position in the assembly process. A
sub-contractor generally is interested in seeing that the end product is
successful so that demand for his component increases, and he generally
is concerned about meeting the mark owner's quality specifications so
that his position as supplier will be secure against the efforts of his
competitors to dislodge him.
The interests of the mark owner are not affected by the way he
organizes his relations with sub-contractors. The marks owner's
primary interest is always the success of his product, and where product
success depends upon acceptable performance by firms associated con-
tractually with the venture, the mark owner probably will set forth
rigorous performance standards in his contract specifications and force
adherence to those standards. His stake in the performance of his sub-
contractors is not lessened when they perform their tasks after the
product has left his premises.
Despite the concert of interests between the mark owner and sub-
contractor, there may be more risk for the consumer that product
quality will vary substantially where some or all of the manufacturing
process takes place at the plant of a sub-contractor. Courts and
agencies may assume that it is more likely that a non-owner-mark-user
will vary quality than that an owner-user will vary quality. It is diffi-
cult to label such an assumption unreasonable.' Presumably one who
contributes to a product marketed under a mark owned by another does
not have the same stake in preserving the goodwill of the enterprise
as the mark owner, if only because contract relations are severable and
sub-contractors replaceable.28 Accordingly, where the mark owner
organizes a manufacturing-marketing effort in which manufacturing
functions are performed by independent firms standing between the
mark owner and the consumer in the assembly process, a requirement
that the mark owner hold contributing independent firms to strict
standards of performance may help to insure that the use of such an
organizational scheme will not increase the consumer's risk of defeated
expectations.29
27See Lahart Control-The Sine Qua Non of a Valid Trademark License, 50
TRADtmAuc REP. 103, 106 (1960).
28see Whitman, Trademark Traps, 42 TRADE MA REP. 583 (1952).
29 Cf. Shniderman, Trademark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy and Fact, 14 LAW
& CoiTx,. PRoB. 248, 262-64 (1949).
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In administering such a requirement, the courts should focus on
the presence or absence of the exercise of quality control, and not on
the presence or absence of defeated consumer expectations. This would
provide an administrable and effective safeguard against the possibility
of defeated expectations, without unduly burdening mark owners or
forcing courts into difficult inquiries about the quantity and quality
of consumer expectations.
Conceivably cases will arise where a complete failure on the part
of a mark owner to control the quality of products to which a licensee
affixes the owner's mark would be unlikely to lead to fraud, deception
or defeated expectations in the market place. Mark owner A might,
for example, license B to distribute heating oil to consumers, using the
mark SOMERLITE. On the one hand, A could tell B to buy oil
that meets certain specifications and A might check B's purchases
periodically to see that B was following directions. Clearly, A would
be controlling the nature and quality of the goods sold under his mark.
Alternatively, A could simply tell B to buy oil when and where B chose,
in which case B would be marketing, under A's mark, oil with which A
had no connection whatsoever, generating a potential for consumer
deception. Any consumer who purchased SOMERLITE oil suppos-
ing it to be the product of one firm, would, in fact, be purchasing a
product which came, not from one firm, but from one of two different
and independent firms. For such a consumer, the risks that product
quality will depart substantially from that which normally might be
anticipated (due to changes in ownership, management, production
procedures and so on) will be much higher than the consumer could
have expected from a survey of the marks confronting him.
It might be argued that since heating oil is heating oil, and since
the sources of oil are relatively few in number and all known to A,
A's grant of wide discretion to B would lead to no differences in the
actual quality of the oil sold under the SOMERLITE mark than would
have occurred had B been controlled more rigorously. But where the
mark means only that oil is selected, rather than manufactured, by the
mark owner, the consumer is entitled to suppose that the mark owner
brought his skill and his knowledge to bear in selecting the product."
One of the early Coca-Cola cases illustrates this point. The Coca-
Cola Company sought to enjoin defendant from manufacturing a
beverage produced according to the Coca-Cola formula, made from
genuine syrup and marketed with genuine bottle crowns and labels.
The court granted the injunction, reasoning that even if defendant sold
a product which was physically identical to the product marketed by
3OSee Somerlite Ltd. v. Brown, 51 R-P.C. 205, 224-25 (Ct. App. 1934).
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bottling companies licensed by plaintiff, the defendant nevertheless was
deceiving consumers because it was not selling a product which was
inspected and guaranteed by Coca-C-ola to be wholesome, palatable,
uniform, clean and excellent 3 1 The trademark COCA-COLA was
seen, in other words, as standing not only for a product of a certain
quality, but for a product which had been subjected to a particular
program of quality control.
This reasoning is analogous to the classic passing off doctrine:
if B sells his product as A's, B has committed a tort,"2 even if B's
product is less expensive and superior to A's. While in such a trans-
action the consumer may get a better product for less money, he is
nevertheless deceived, for he asked for A's product and received B's.
The same sort of harm is present in both the SOMERLITE and
COCA-COLA examples-consumers were being confronted with two
quality control programs where they reasonably supposed only a single
program to exist,3 3 and were being misled into buying a product sup-
posing it to be connected with A's quality control program when it was
in fact connected with B's.
V
If trademark licensees submit to the mark owner's control to
insure that consumers who rely upon marks as guides to purchasing
decisions find the licensed mark useful, then the practice of trademark
licensing need not prove inconsistent with basic trademark philosophy. 4
But basic trademark philosophy would seem to require that mark
owners exercise enough supervision over licensees to prevent deviations
in production procedures which might impair the usefulness of the mark
to the consumer. A requirement of supervision, in turn, requires that
individuals or institutions be given authority to police the requirement
and requires norms against which conduct can be measured and penal-
ties for failure to meet these norms assessed.
Not surprisingly, the first institution given responsibility for
policing mark licensing arrangements in the United States was the
court; the judicial process has borne the burden of developing rules
and sanctions for licensing arrangements, although the policing task is
shared in a small way by the Patent Office and by the Federal Trade
Commission. Moreover, because trademark licensing is a relatively
31 Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 F. 513 (8th Cir. 1916).
32 See Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84, 89-90, 49 Eng. Rep. 994-997 (Rolls Ct. 1843);
cf. Burgess v. Burgess, 3 De G. M. & G. 896, 43 Eng. Rep. 351 (Ch. 1853) ; Welch
v. Knott, 4 K. & J. 747, 751, 70 Eng. Rep. 310, 312 (V.C. 1857).
3 3 See Coca-Cola Co. v. 3. G. Butler & Sons, 229 F. 224, 230 (E.D. Ark. 1916).
34 "Thus it is clear that contrary to defendant's contention, registered marks are
franchisable by the owner thereof." Boersma v. Executive Travel Club, Inc., 256
F. Supp. 289, 291 (D.D.C. 1966).
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recent development,35 the courts have not yet devised a complete system
of rules for its regulation. For example, it has only recently become
established that a written contract, in which quality standards are
expressed as contractual obligations, is not a requisite of a valid
licensing arrangement. In 1959, both the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit 36 and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals " emphasized that a licensing arrangement can comply with
the requirement that a licensor control the nature and quality of
products marketed under his mark, even where there are no express
contractual provisions setting forth standards and giving the mark
owner a right to inspect and supervise his licensee's activities.s A
writing would be an acceptable requirement if it eased the task of
administering licensing relationships, but it would not; 39 licensing
arrangements are usually in writing in any event, yet courts have to
focus, in most cases, as they should, upon the actual relationship, rather
than the writing. The slight administrative gain from requiring
licenses to be in writing would be more than offset by the cost of re-
moving judicial protection from marks whose owners have controlled
their use without a writing.40
It is not yet clear that the courts have rejected the proposition
that a writing will save a licensing arrangement in which there is
in fact an absence of control. The courts in time must reject this
idea, because accepting the existence of a writing as an end to an
inquiry into the acceptability of the licensing arrangement would be
35 With the exception of Marsh v. Billings, 7 Cush. 322 (Mass. 1852) ; Meridian
Brittania Co. v. Parker, 39 Conn. 450 (1872); Winsor v. Clyde, 9 Phila. Rep. 513
(C.P. 1872); Mattingly v. Stone, 12 Ky. L. Rptr. 72, 12 S.W. 467 (Ct. App. 1889),
opinion on mnotion for rehearing, 14 S.W. 47 (1890); Batchellor v. Thompson, 93
F. 660 (2d Cir. 1899); R. Heinisch's Sons Co. v. Boker, 86 F. 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1898);
and, perhaps, on its alternative rationale, Weener v. Brayton, 152 Mass. 101, 25 N.E.
46 (1890), all other reported opinions dealing with trademark licensing occur in the
twentieth century.
36 Cf. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 368 (2d Cir.
1959) (licensor defeated counterclaim in infringement suit).
37 Cf. Sealy, Inc. v. Simmons Co., 265 F.2d 934, 937 (C.C.P.A. 1959) (licensor
opposed application for federal registration).
38 See Progressive Welder Co. v. Collom, 125 F. Supp. 307 (D. Minn. 1954)
(licensor defeated former licensee). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board also
clearly has taken the position that the Lanham Act does not require that licenses be
in writing. See McCormick & Co. v. Summers, 141 U.S.P.Q. 258 (Tm. T. & A. Bd.
1964), rev'd on other grounds, 354 F.2d 668 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ; Clarke v. The Sander-
son Films, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 130 (Tm. T. & A. Bd. 1963). See also Sealy, Inc. v.
Simmons Co., 265 F.2d 934 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
39 But see Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research & Dev. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 852
(W.D. Ark. 1967).
40 Particularly likely to be caught by a technical rule focusing on a writing rather
than on reality are mark owning firms which incorporate subsidiaries and permit
them to use a mark without formally licensing its use. See, e.g., Sterling Drug Inc.
v. Lincoln Laboratories Inc., 322 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1963) ; United States Ozone Co. v.
United States Ozone Co. of America, 62 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1932); Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. v. Atomol Mfg. Co., 58 U.S.P.Q. 497 (Comm'r. 1943); Applications by
Kidax (Shirts) Ltd., [1959] R.P.C. 295 (Ch. Div. 1959).
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an abdication of responsibility by the courts, whose task is to protect
consumers in the markets by looking to the actual quality control
exercised. In Alligator Company v. Robert Bruce, Inc.,41 the
court stated that the fact that a licensing agreement establishes an
appropriate relationship between licensor and licensee on paper is not
determinative of the acceptability of the relationship in fact; it is what
the parties actually do in carrying out the agreement and not what
the agreement entitles them to do which is of public concern.' E. I.
Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp.43 is probably the most
famous case in which a court appears to pay undue deference to a
writing. DuPont petitioned to cancel the Celanese Corporation's regis-
tration of CELANESE for dyestuffs. DuPont's challenge was based
on allegations that American Aniline, the Celanese Corporation's
licensee, marketed products under the mark CELANESE, without
mention of the licensing arrangement, in ways which suggested that
Aniline owned the mark, and that the Celanese Corporation itself knew
about and approved the marketing method. DuPont theorized that
since Aniline's marketing technique resulted in the mark CELANESE
no longer indicating the Celanese Corporation name, the Celanese
Corporation's federal registration was invalid and subject to
cancellation.
DuPont's theory was clearly deficient, since it supposed that the
requirement that a single mark represents a single program of quality
control in the market, in turn, required that the control be identified by
name, or, at least, not misidentified. The court should have ruled that
the petition for cancellation would not lie because the existence of a
uniform program of quality control for goods marketed under the
CELANESE mark was not disputed. The court announced, instead,
that a licensing agreement in which the licensor reserves the right to
continue the use of the mark and which provides that the agreement
may be terminated by the licensor is not an abandonment of the
registered mark. "It is obvious," the court concluded, "that the
license agreement is not a naked license agreement, and that appellee
41176 F. Supp. 377, 379 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
42But see Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research & Dev. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 852
(W.D. Ark. 1967), where the parties to a written mark license omitted all references
to control, leaving the licensor without an explicit contractual right to exercise any
control over the nature and quality of the goods produced and sold under the license.
The court ruled that the licensor granted a naked license and in so doing abandoned
his rights in the licensed mark.
The court, perhaps without considering the full implication of its statement, said
it is the right to control rather than the actual exercise of control which determines
whether a license is valid. The court then stated, more plausibly, that if the licensor
attempted to enforce controls upon the licensee in court, "he would doubtlessly be met
with the parol evidence rule and would not be allowed to amend the original duly
executed document. . . ." Id. at 864. (Even in an infringement suit?)
43167 F.2d 484 (C.C.P.A. 1948).
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has not abandoned its mark. . . " ' Although the court stated that
there were no allegations that the quality control terms of the agreement
were not fully carried out by both parties, the tenor of the opinion may
lead the casual reader to the misunderstanding that the presence of a
writing showing the licensor's intent to continue to use the mark will
shield the licensor from a judgment of abandonment (that is, for-
feiture) of mark rights regardless of the state of the record on the
issue of actual control.
Another case placing great emphasis on the terms of the writing
involved a licensing arrangement between Land O'Lakes Creameries
and a Baltimore food broker .4  Land O'Lakes licensed the broker to
use the mark LAND O'LAKES on canned goods in 1929, and for
thirty-five years thereafter the broker procured a full line of canned
goods from various canners which he marketed under the LAND
O'LAKES mark. The mark owner exercised no positive control over
its licensee or his sources, but the district court felt that the contract
between the parties justified the mark owner's reliance on the licensee's
quality control program and satisfied the requirement that the mark
owner control the licensee. The court of appeals affirmed, stressing
that a dearth of complaints about quality during the forty-year period
in which the broker used the mark (on labels containing the mark
owner's address) justified the mark owner in equating reliance upon
the licensee's control over quality with actual supervision of the
licensee.
Wolfie's Restaurant, Inc. v. Lincoln Restaurant Corp.6 is similar,
in that the court upheld a licensing arrangement in which the licensee
was required only to continue to operate his restaurant as he had in
the past and in which the licensor had a right to investigate the
licensee's activities-a right unexercised at the time of suit, after two
years. The court reasoned that the contract provisions, setting forth
the status quo ante standard and the right to investigate, legitimated
the arrangement, and ruled that proof of the failure of the licensor to
investigate, standing alone, was of no legal significance.
The Wolfie's and Land O'Lakes opinions might stand for the
proposition that the absence of proof of consumer dissatisfaction with
the quality of the licensee's product renders insignificant proof that
the licensor has not actually supervised the production processes of his
licensee. Equating a contractual "right" to control, or (as one author
44 1d. at 488.
45Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co, 221 F. Supp.
576 (E.D. Wis. 1963), aff'd, 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964).
46143 U.S.P.Q. 310 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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labels it, negative control) , with actual or positive control, seems to
put the courts in the difficult and administratively undesirable position
of measuring injuries to consumer expectations rather than safeguard-
ing consumer expectations by measuring the quantum of quality control
exercised by the licensor. To suggest that a "right" to inspect the
licensee's operation or a "right" to terminate the license " for cause
or at will is sufficient control over quality is to ignore the reason for
imposing the requirement of control in the first place.
A licensee, it was earlier postulated, is somewhat more likely than
a mark owner to vary product quality, giving rise to a requirement
that a mark owner who chooses to license the use of his mark must
eliminate this additional increment of risk to the consumer by super-
vising his licensee. But to permit the mark owner to supervise in the
market place, rather than on the licensee's premises, is to run the risk
that an irresponsible licensee will fill the market place with deficient
products before the mark owner will be alerted to the need to halt his
licensee's production process.
Mark owners prefer to supervise quality before goods reach the
market place. For example, the Manischewitz people went to court
to stop the distribution, under the Manischewitz mark, of a mere 525
cases of canned soup which had been rejected for not meeting
Manischewitz quality standards, and which they feared might fail to
fulfill consumer expectations.49 The Forstmann Woolen Company also
has attempted to enjoin the use of its trademark on products made with
Forstmann materials but not made under Forstmann supervision," and
several similar suits have been brought by other corporations including
the Coca-Cola Company.51 These cases evidence concern by mark
47tWoodward, Some Observations on Legitimate Control of the Nature and
Quality of the Goods, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 609 (1959). In Ritz Associates, Inc. v.
Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 522, 138 U.S.P.Q. 404 (N.Y. App. Div.
1963) (per curiam), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 670, 198 N.E.2d 905, 249 N.Y.S.2d 873, 141 U.S.
P.Q. 757 (1964), the court affirmed a lower court decision granting summary judgment,
declaring a licensee free to discontinue paying a royalty for the use of the name
RITZ TOWER. One of the alternative grounds for decision was that the licensor
did not control the licensee's use of the mark. Judge Rabin dissented in part, saying
that there were two questions of fact: whether a license providing for a revocation
if the licensee fails to maintain a "high-class" hotel is without standards, and whether
there was sufficient supervision even though the licensor entered no documents asserting
positive action on its part.
48 See authorities cited note 47 mipra.
49Manischewitz Food Prods. Inc. v. Rosenberg, 80 U.S.P.Q. 427 (E.D. Pa.
1949).
50 Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 144 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) ; Forstmann Woolen Co. v. J. W. Mays, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.Y. 1950) ;
Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1950);
Forstmann Woolen Co. v. J. W. Mays, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 459 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
51E.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 225 F. 429 (D. Kan. 1915), rev'd, 238 F. 513
(8th Cir. 1916) ; Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947) ; B. B.
& R. Knight, Inc. v. W. L. Milner & Co., 283 F. 816 (N.D. Ohio 1922).
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owners that products likely to impair goodwill by disappointing con-
sumers be kept out of the market place, and any legal formulation that
focuses on the point of production only after defective products have
found their way onto retailer's shelves is inconsistent with this concern.
In Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett,5" the district court found against the
Coca-Cola Company (and was reversed) when the company sought
to enjoin a former licensee from continuing to use the COCA-COLA
mark. The lower court reasoned that the defendant had acquired the
basic ingredients in good faith and proposed to put them to the use
contemplated by the parties at the time the Coca-Cola Company sold
them to the defendant. The effect of the district court decision was
to remand the Coca-Cola Company to the market place to judge the
nature and quality of the former licensee's product there, with resort
to the courts (presumably on an infringement theory) if the product
marketed under the COCA-COLA mark turned out to be of un-
acceptable quality.
This form of quality control is exactly the type of control legiti-
mated in the Land O'Lakes case. It is no control at all with respect
to some quantity of output, and it subjects consumers to unnecessary
risks of substantial quality deviations by disgruntled, careless or
financially strapped licensees. From the consumer's point of view,
the licensor must supervise quality in the licensee's plant and not in
the market place.
The question of how much supervision is sufficient seems to be a
difficult judicial question. In Purity Cheese Co. v. Frank Ryser
Co.,5 3 for example, plaintiff complained that defendant was infringing
the mark MAY-BUD for cheese. Defendant moved for summary
judgment on an unclean hands theory. Defendant alleged that
plaintiff was not entitled to the aid of a court of equity to protect
its mark, because the mark had been licensed to others whose use
of the mark was not controlled by plaintiff. Plaintiff's bill of
particulars admitted that plaintiff licensed its distributor to use
MAY-BUD on cheese and that some cheese sold under the mark had
been manufactured by companies other than plaintiff or its licensee
and "plaintiff ha[d] no knowledge by whom." Judge Duffy granted
defendant's motion, stating that when plaintiff permitted its licensee
to use MAY-BUD on cheese supplied by sources unknown to plaintiff,
plaintiff became party to a fraud on the public. The Seventh Circuit
reversed, ruling correctly that summary judgment was inappropriate
because all that appeared was that cheese not of plaintiff's manufacture
52225 F. 429 (D. Kan. 1915), rev'd, 238 F. 513 (8th Cir. 1916).
5357 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Wis. 1944), reV'd, 153 F.2d (7th Cir. 1946).
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was sold under plaintiff's mark, a fact not alone sufficient to deprive
plaintiff of its mark rights.
While plaintiff's admissions indicate that it was probably derelict
in supervising its licensee, they are not conclusive; plaintiff might have
set standards for its licensee to follow in selecting cheese to be
marketed under the MAY-BUD mark and might have checked to see
that the licensee followed directions. Whether it did is the crucial
question, a question unanswered by the papers before the trial court
at the time of the motion for summary judgment.
But suppose the Purity Cheese case had gone to trial and the court
had learned more about the actual relationship between the mark owner
and its licensee. If the mark owner had proved the existence of a writ-
ten agreement setting forth standards for the licensee and providing for
on-the-premises inspection by the licensor and the defendant had proved
nothing, should the court have drawn the inference that there was actual
supervision? On the other hand, if the defendant had offered testi-
mony that the licensor had not inspected the licensee's operation at all
in the past six months, the past two years (as in Wolfie's) or since the
beginning of the relationship (as in Land O'Lakes and Wolfie's), how
should the trial court have reacted? Assuming that a court chooses to
work with a rule requiring actual or point-of-production supervision, the
answer may depend upon the length of time during which there was
no inspection. In the Land O'Lakes case, the mark owner should have
lost any rights it had to control the use of the mark in law, by failing
to control the use of the mark in fact for many years. But in Wolfie's,
only two years had elapsed. Does an "actual control" principle require
inspection every year? Every five years? Is the requirement different
for restaurants and motels, 4 than for canned goods and donut mixes?
Courts generally have found it impossible to find insufficient super-
vision where there is evidence that there was at some time some actual
54 In Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Atlanta Americana Motor Hotel Corp., 254 F. Supp.
743 (N.D. Ga. 1966), plaintiff, who operated AMERICANA hotels in Miami, New
York and San Juan, enjoined defendant from making an infringing use of plaintiff's
federally registered service mark in connection with defendant's Atlanta motel. In
1962, defendant informed plaintiff that defendant recommended plaintiff's motels to its
customers and made reservations for them at plaintiff's motels as often as possible.
Plaintiff responded by asking defendant to continue to advise all guests of plaintiff's
hotels and in return plaintiff would see that guests requesting bookings in Atlanta
would be put in defendant's motel. The court labeled this arrangement a valid license
of plaintiff's mark, revocable at wil. It certainly set forth no standards, and there
appeared to be no supervision. Perhaps plaintiff satisfied the requirement of control
by revoking the license before the period expired during which a "first exercise of
actual control" was still legally possible. See Geo. A. Hormel & Co. v. Hereford
Heaven Brands, Inc., 341 F.2d 158, 160 (C.C.P.A. 1965), where the court, speaking
to the assertion that Hormel abandoned its mark by failing to control a recently
acquired licensee, agreed with the conclusion of the board "That 'it cannot at this
time be said that Hornel has failed to exercise such control' as to preclude its right
in this opposition." Compare cases where the mark owner acquiesces in an infringing
use of his mark for a period of time, then successfully asserts a claim against the
second user: e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. Midwest Cordage Co., 153 U.S.P.Q.
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supervision. In Wolfie's the court was unwilling to rule that a com-
plete absence of actual supervision was insufficient. In Keebler Weyl
Baking Co. v. J. S. Ivins' Sons, Inc.,5 the defendant in the infringe-
ment suit challenged plaintiff's licensing system. Plaintiff was one of
sixteen wholly-owned subsidiaries of United Biscuit Company and
permitted seven of the other subsidiaries to use its mark. The record
showed that at the inception of each licensor-licensee relationship,
plaintiff sent an employee to show each of the seven how to manu-
facture the product that was to bear the licensed mark. The court
could see no imposition upon the public and no element in the scheme
which would impair plaintiff's right to exclude others from using
its mark.
The determinative factors for the court were the general control
of United Biscuit over plaintiff and the licensees, and plaintiff's use of
an employee to give instructions to the licensees at the beginning of the
relationship.5" The opinion indicated that plaintiff and some of its
licensees had been independent of the central holding company at one
time, but failed to discuss the degree to which the parent participated
in the management decisions of its subsidiaries or the amount of time
devoted to supervision of licensees by plaintiff's employee. The
73 (C.C.P.A. 1967). Also see Baxter Laboratories v. Don Baxter, Inc., 87
U.S.P.Q. 122 (Comm'r 1950), where an application for a trademark registration,
alleging a controlled use of the mark by a related company, was denied, the Com-
missioner noting that the allegation by the applicant of continuous quality control
of the licensee's output was not supported by evidence of continuous checking of
samples or continuous checking at the iser's plant. The standards in Playboy Club
licenses apply to decor, design, quality and quantity of food, beverages and entertain-
ment. Licensees are also provided with an operating manual. The Playboy Club
licensees are policed by the licensor's agents who regularly visit the clubs and report
the degree of compliance with standards. See Turner v. HMH Publishing Co., 380
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1967).
55 7 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1934).
56 Compare two decisions under British law. In Bowden Wire Ltd. v. Bowden
Brake Co., 31 R.P.C. 385 (H.L. 1914), a company licensed its subsidiary to use the
parent's trademark and was deemed to have thereby lost its rights in the mark.
In In re Trademark "Radiation", 47 R.P.C. 37 (Comptroller General 1930), the mark
owner held virtually all of the shares of a group of associated companies who manu-
factured the product to which the mark was attached. The Comptroller General
ruled that the mark owner's licensing scheme was acceptable, not because of the
ownership link, but because the owner actually controlled the manufacturing process
of the associated companies and subjected them to rigid quality control procedures.
Bowden Wire was distinguished on the ground that Bowden Wire and its subsidiary
were independent with regard to production decisions.
In T. Oertli A. G. v. E. J. Bowman (London) Ltd., 1959 R.P.C. 1 (H.L. 1959),
a Swiss mark owner was held to have forfeited exclusive rights in its mark by failing
to control the manufacturing procedures of its British licensee. The record showed
that the mark owner did provide some initial specifications for setting up the pro-
duction line and did provide some tools for accomplishing this task. See also Baxter
Laboratories v. Don Baxter, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q. 122 (Comm'r 1950), where the Com-
missioner refused to find a related company relationship under a statutory standard
which would support an application for registration despite a record showing joint
advertising, exchanges of information, payment of royalties and an original agreement.
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Keebler opinion suggests that the likelihood was quite high that there
was no single program of quality control, but rather a multitude of
programs. Yet the court refused to look beyond the exercise of actual
control by the mark owner in the distant past and the existence of
potential control in the relation of the licensor and its licensees to the
parent company.
57
It is reasonably clear that the party challenging a licensing rela-
tionship as inadequately controlled should and must produce evidence
of inadequate control, or suffer a directed verdict or its equivalent.58
It is also reasonably clear that the party challenging a licensing relation-
ship must carry the burden of convincing the trier of fact of the
probability that for some significant period the licensor inadequately
controlled the quality of its licensee's output Thus, evidence that
the mark owner licensed without a writing or licensed through a
writing containing no clauses covering quality standards, even though
unrebutted, will not ordinarily entitle " the challenger to a directed
verdict on the issue of adequacy of control; nor, indeed, will it guar-
antee that the trier of fact will infer from such evidence the probability
that adequate control was in fact lacking.' When the mark owner
introduces some evidence of actual control, it seems that there is no
possibility that the party challenging the licensing relationship will be
able to get a directed verdict, regardless of the quality of the chal-
lenger's evidence that the control exercised was in fact inadequate.
6
Because no court has yet worked out any guidelines for deciding
whether control actually exercised is adequate, cases such as Keebler
are almost always resolved in favor of the mark owner on the fact
question of adequacy of control. But guidelines for decisions about the
adequacy of the licensor's quality control should be developed. The
5 7 See also Omag Optik Und Mechanik A. G. v. Weinstein, 85 F. Supp. 631
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (distributor's activities did not affect the firm's ownership of the
mark or its post-war right to enjoin its distributor from further making use of it).
58 Sterling Drug Inc. v. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc., 322 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1963)
(dismissal of plaintiff's action on the ground that it had failed to prove exercise of
quality control held erroneous as a matter of law) ; American Foods, Inc. v. Golden
Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1963) ; E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Celanese Corp., 167 F.2d 484 (C.C.P.A. 1948).
59 But cf. Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research & Dev. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 852
(W.D. Ark. 1967), discussed at note 42 spra and at notes 79-81 infra and accom-
panying text.
60 See Geo. A. Hormel & Co. v. Hereford Heaven Brands, Inc., 341 F.2d 158,
160 (C.C.P.A. 1965). But cf. Ex parte Pure Oil Co., 99 U.S.P.Q. 19 (Comm'r 1953),
where an applicant for registration relying on use by related companies was required
to document the method and extent of control exercised, with more than a bare
recitation that the nature and quality of the services in connection with which the
mark is used are controlled by the applicant.
61 Cf. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (Zd Cir. 1959).
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literature of industrial quality control provides generalized norms"2
which courts might refine through a series of applications in particular
cases. For example, a firm which contracts to buy raw material or a
component part ordinarily provides the supplying firm with clear
specifications for such things as size, shape, chemical content and
tensile strength. If characteristics not easily expressed numerically are
specified-finish, color, texture, flexibility-samples of acceptable and
unacceptable work are normally provided.' The purchaser generally
'establishes an acceptable quality level-a standard of conformance which
enables the supplier to know precisely what deviations from the basic
specification will be tolerated. Finally, the purchaser normally advises
his supplier what tests will be used at the purchaser's plant to assure
that the in-coming product meets the quality specifications.
Sound business practices dictate that a mark owner, as a matter
of routine, ought to do as much to control the quality of his licensee's
output as a purchaser does to control the quality of his supplier's pro-
duction. Thus a mark owner should communicate specifications,
establish a minimum quality level or conformance standard and assure
himself that the licensee's performance conforms to the standard. It
seems unlikely that the judicial process can focus meaningfully on the
content, as opposed to the existence, of either the basic specifications
or the conformance standard, except perhaps when there is mere sham;
however, courts can require that licensees actually promulgate specifica-
tions and actually use quality control methods of the sort that provide
the same level of assurance of conformance to standards which would
satisfy a typical, quality conscious industrial purchaser who was pur-
chasing from the licensee.
All that the licensor need do to satisfy the standard is to inspect
the licensee's performance by sampling. Whether the licensor's tech-
nique measures up to the general standard of what a quality conscious
industrial purchaser would do to assure acceptable performance by a
supplier will be easily determined, in most cases, by reference to basic
principles of statistical quality control. Whether a particular sampling
technique permits the licensor to determine if his licensee is performing
acceptably is a matter of probability mathematics, 4 and a court should
have no trouble deciding, in a particular case, that there is or is not
a probability (law-fact) that the licensor inadequately controlled his
licensee's output.
62 Id.; see G. Georgia, The Application of Quality Control to Purchasing-Vendor
Relationships, Quality Control in Action 90 (Amer. Mgmt. Assoc. Mgmt. Rep. No. 9,
1958).
6 B. HANSEN, QUAL-rY CONTROL: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 3-5, 368, 382
(1963).
4MId. at 10.
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Whether tests taken from industrial quality control will prove
palatable to courts traditionally reluctant to strip mark owners of
rights will depend on the quality of counsels' efforts to educate the
courts in the public interest. The burden of persuasion will un-
doubtedly remain a substantial barrier to those challenging licensing
arrangements. However, courts may find that a solicitude for mark
owners can be accommodated to the public interest by resort to
remedies other than complete extinguishment of mark rights in cases
involving uncontrolled trademark licenses.
In the past, courts have been reluctant to strip mark owners of
rights, presumably because of the stringency of a decree destroying
completely-for all time, for all products, for all places--carefully
nurtured mark rights when the mark owner's lapse was momentary and
affected only a few consumers. But an all-or-nothing approach to the
problem is called for neither by principle nor practice, despite the vogue
for the notion that a naked license works a total abandonment of the
mark. In practice a naked license does not work a total abandonment
of the mark, but a forefeiture 65 of mark rights only in those product
and geographic markets where the mark points to the quality control
program of someone other than the licensor. Such a result was reached
in E. F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co.,66 where A was
found to have licensed the use of the mark OLDE TOWNE BEER
to B north of, and to C south of, the Ohio River. The court found
that A had supervised the use of the mark by C but not by B, so that
the "naked" license to B resulted in an abandonment by A of rights
in the mark north of the Ohio. North of the Ohio, OLDE TOWNE
BEER was beer controlled by B, and south of the Ohio, it was beer
controlled by A. To permit A to assert a right to control the use of
the mark in the north would be to subject consumers there to a
possible substantial change of quality standards, for it would give A,
who was not controlling quality, power to cut off B, who was. There
is no basis for divesting A of the mark south of the Ohio, however, for
6 5 Judge Learned Hand insisted that, in the related field of copyright, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between abandonment, strictly speaking, and what he called for-
feiture. He suggested that rights in literary property could be abandoned by some
overt act manifesting an intent to surrender all rights in it, but he also said that the
law could work a forfeiture of rights in literary property if the public interest required,
and the forfeiture would occur despite the absence of an intent to surrender on the
part of the proprietor. National Comics Publications Inc. v. Fawcett Publications,
Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 597-98 (2d Cir. 1951). Where a trademark owner intends no
general surrender or dedication of his mark to the public and where the public interest
nevertheless demands a forfeiture, a "property" analysis would suggest that the area
in which rights are forfeited be limited to what the public interest demands. In fact,
the public interest itself requires that the mark owner be disabled only in markets
where the mark points to another, and not in markets where the mark still points
to him, for to deny him protection in the latter markets would be to invite opportunists
to make confusing uses of the mark.
66136 F.2d 512 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 763 (1944).
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there A was controlling quality.6 7 To declare A's right forfeited there
would be to confer upon C (as successor to abandoned mark rights) a
power to change quality standards by freeing C from the legal obliga-
tion to conform to A's standards-standards which consumers south
of the Ohio had come to expect to govern the production of OLDE
TOWNE BEER.
There are several decisions relating to trademark registrations
which are consistent with the notion that failure to control a licensee's
use of the mark need not disable the mark owner from successfully
asserting rights in the mark in all places against all defendants. In
Somerlite Ltd. v. Brown,' defendant successfully counterclaimed in an
infringement suit for a judgment expunging plaintiff's registration for
failing to control the licensee's use of the mark.' Mr. Justice Maugham
felt that expungement was proper, since plaintiff's registration covered
all of Great Britain and the record showed that in some part of the
country, the mark referred to defendant, not plaintiff. But Maugham
thought that plaintiff might, after the case, reapply for a registration
covering a more limited area, and, on appeal, Lord Hanworth, M.R.,
agreed that, while expungement was proper, it was still open to
plaintiff to apply for a limited registration. The position of Maugham
and Hanworth was, in short, that plaintiff, by failing to control his
licensee's use of the mark, had not abandoned the mark in all areas or
for all products, but had merely forfeited rights in those places where
the mark had come to stand for one other than plaintiff.
Courts convinced that a mark owner has failed to control a
licensee have occasionally responded by refusing to permit the mark
owner to invoke the aid of a court of equity on an unclean hands
theory. Such a refusal is probably not the response most consonant
with the public interest, but it does hold out to the mark owner the
possibility of successfully suing other infringers in other courts in other
markets. A refusal by a court to aid a mark owner who has "mis-
used" the mark by failing to control its licensees' uses is, in one sense,
then, similar to a judgment that by the failure, rights in the mark have
been partially, but not necessarily totally, abandoned.
Broeg v. Duchaine"7 is the leading licensing-unclean hands case.
Plaintiff sought an injunction and damages for infringement of the
trademark MOTHER PARKER, which plaintiff had used in the
6 7 Two other cases which suggest that a naked license has a limited impact on
mark rights are Checker Cab Mfg. Corp. v. Green Cab Co., 35 F.2d 631 (6th Cir.
1929); MacMahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468 (8th Cir.
1901).
68 51 R.P.C. 205 (Ct. App. 1934).
69 See also The 880 Stores v. Martinez, 227 Ore. 147, 361 P.2d 809 (1961).
70 319 Mass. 711, 67 N.E.2d 466 (1946).
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past on biscuit mix in New York, in connection with retail stores in
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and which plaintiff was using at
the time of the suit to identify itself as a radio personality on programs
discussing food. Defendant was licensed by plaintiff to sell bread
under the MOTHER PARKER mark in Southeast Massachusetts,
and did so from 1940 to 1943 with appropriate payments of royalty to
plaintiff. After 1943, the royalties were unpaid. The court assumed
plaintiff to have valid mark rights in MOTHER PARKER for
bakery products, but ruled that it could not prevail because it came
into equity with unclean hands occasioned by its licensing agreement
with defendant, which left defendant at liberty to affix the mark to
bread or doughnuts of whatever style or quality he chose. The court
suggested that perhaps plaintiff should be denied relief on the ground
that the licensing arrangement worked an abandonment of the mark,
but, in view of the unclean hands disposition, the court expressly de-
clined to decide the abandonment question.
Presumably the mark MOTHER PARKER meant, in Southeast
Massachusetts, bread produced under defendant's control. But what
MOTHER PARKER meant to shoppers in New York and New
Hampshire and to radio listeners in New England is another question.
If bread was in fact still sold under plaintiff's control in New
Hampshire, the uncontrolled licensing arrangement in the Massachu-
setts case should not bar plaintiff against either controlled licensees or
against strangers in New Hampshire, assuming New Hampshire and
Southeast Massachusetts to be distinct geographic markets. It also
seems clear that plaintiff's failure to control defendant's use of the mark,
and consequent forfeiture to defendant of the right to control the use
of the mark, should not subject plaintiff automatically to the possi-
bility that a second Mother Parker could appear with impunity on a
rival radio program (even as a licensee of defendant).
The unclean hands approach to uncontrolled licensing is, then, a
mechanism for accommodating the interests of consumers in markets
unaffected by the mark owner's dereliction. Its serious defects are
that it neither clearly establishes the fact of defendant's ascendency in
his own market, nor pinpoints the time when defendant succeeded in
part to plaintiff's mark rights.
Of course, a mark owner may be so irresponsible in his dealings
with licensees that he forfeits-indeed, abandons-all of his rights to
control the use of the mark against all defendants in all product markets
and in all places. Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency 71
is often cited for the proposition that uncontrolled licensing works a
713 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 1924).
19681
462 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.116:435
loss of all rights in the mark. But the licensor in that case may in fact
have forfeited all rights, for the use of its trade name apparently was
licensed in all sections of the country to independent local businesses
who were permitted to do business as they pleased without the inter-
ference or supervision of the licensor. The court said, undoubtedly
correctly, that the name stood, not for the efforts, experience and re-
sponsibility of the licensor, but for these characteristics of the persons
conducting the local offices.
Of course, a licensor could lose all rights in the mark by failing
to control only a single licensee. The case of Professor Dr. G. Jaeger
v. Jaeger Co.72 is illustrative, involving as it did an uncontrolled
licensee who served all of England. The court was convinced that the
mark JAEGER signaled control by the licensee and not the licensor,
holding that the licensor had forfeited to the licensee all rights in
the mark in England. In Tanner-Brice Co. v. Sims,3 Sims agreed to
permit Tanner-Brice to develop a grocery chain known as the Sims
Service Stores. Later, when Sims severed his relationship with
Tanner-Brice, he sought to enjoin further use of SIMS SERVICE
STORES. The court ruled that,7' by failing to control the use of the
name, Sims lost the possible claim that Tanner-Brice's use inured to
Sims' benefit. As a result, Sims was left without a basis for claiming
mark rights anywhere, even though his "licensee" had not exploited
all of the territory of the United States.
Finally, it seems that a mark owner might license the use of a
mark to such a great number of licensees, without subsequent exercise
of control, that the possibility that the mark could thereafter perform
a mark function for anybody-producer or consumer-would be en-
tirely dissipated. U-CONTROL for model airplanes was apparently
widely and indiscriminately licensed in such a way that a court con-
cluded that none could thereafter assert mark rights in the phrase.75
The terms SILVERBLU, ROYAL PASTEL and TOPAZ for mink
pelts were rendered unamenable to trademark status by the practice
of a mink farmers' association in offering a license to make an un-
7244 R.P.C. 437 (Ct. App. 1927).
73 174 Ga. 13 (Super. Ct 1931).
74 Orthodoxy has it both that a license, to be valid, must cover an existing mark
and that a mark right springs into existence only through a mark use. But see Roes-
sing Bronze Co. v. Concast A. G., 152 U.S.P.Q. 344 (Tm. T. & A. Bd. 1966)
(attaching significance to advertising use). Accepting the initial proposition suggests
that a licensing arrangement in which the first mark use is by the licensee is theo-
retically impossible. In re C. F. Donald Co., 122 U.S.P.Q. 401 (Tm. T. & A. Bd.
1959), so held. That the Sims case involved a trade name, which attains legal sig-
nificance only through continued use, rather than a trademark, further complicates
Sims' position.
75 American Junior Aircraft Co. v. L. M. Cox Mfg. Co., 46 TRADEmAmc REP. 62
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
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controlled use of the terms to anyone who would pay a stipulated fee.76
To summarize, the cases suggest that a mark owner can lose to
others all rights in a mark by improperly licensing it to one or to many,
or indeed, can be so derelict in controlling licensees as to render the
mark useless. While principle suggests that a mark owner should
forfeit rights in a mark which is improperly licensed, principle also
requires that the extent of the forfeiture be limited by the extent of
the dereliction: a mark used in two distinct geographic markets,
properly in one and improperly in the other, should be forfeited only
in one market; likewise, a mark used in two distinct product markets,
properly in one and improperly in the other, should be forfeited only in
one market. To punish a mark owner for failing to control his licensee's
use in one market by disabling the owner from enforcing mark rights in
another unaffected market is unnecessarily detrimental to consumers for
whom the mark remains useful in the second market. To assume that
occasional harm to consumers in unaffected markets is more than
offset by the benefit to consumers in general flowing from the deterrent
effects of a total forfeiture rule is to forget that a partial forfeiture
rule also deters, perhaps as effectively as the more stringent rule. To
suppose that occasional hardship to consumers in "second" markets
unaffected by an uncontrolled license is offset by the gains inherent in
an easily administered rule ignores the reality that a total forfeiture
rule is unlikely to stand the test of hard cases. The courts are likely
either to water down the quality control requirement or expand the
de minimis category in cases where a few among hundreds of licensees
are improperly supervised.77 Moreover, such concessions to fairness
force the court to draw lines much in the same way as is required by
a rule limiting forfeiture to markets where the mark no longer in fact
affirms that the licensor controls the quality of the products to which
the mark is affixed.
The cases have thus far neither clearly embraced nor clearly
rejected the partial forfeiture approach to uncontrolled licensing. While
a total abandonment rule has usually been invoked by the few courts
which thus far have been confronted with the question of the legal
76 Midwest Fur Producers Ass'n v. Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n, 127 F. Supp.
217 (W.D. Wis. 1954).
W
7 In Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 368 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1959), testimony that the mark owner distributed packaging material containing
its mark for use by some retail bakeries with which it never had agreements on
quality split the court of appeals, 2-1, on the question of the sufficiency of the mark
owner's control of its licensees' quality, the majority being unwilling to rule against
the mark owner. In Union Tank Car Co. v. Lindsay Soft Water Corp., 257 F. Supp.
510 (D. Neb. 1966), the court stated that the evidence showed that the licensor was
not overly zealous in policing its dealers' operations and that the licensor's policing
network was far from the most effective possible, but the court could not say that
the licensor had forfeited exclusive rights in the mark as a result.
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effect on mark rights of an uncontrolled license, the facts in the cases
have supported a conclusion that mark rights in fact had been wholly,
rather than partially, forfeited.7 8
In Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research & Development Corp.,79 for
example, the Robinson Company, a fishing tackle jobber with head-
quarters in Georgia, licensed the use of its mark to an Arkansas manu-
facturer of artificial lures. The agreement contained no standards.
The court ruled that the naked agreement "effected an abandonment
of the mark." The court quoted from Midwest Fur Producers
(TOPAZ, SILVERBLU, ROYAL PASTEL) for the proposition
that a naked license "amounts to an abandonment of any trademark
rights that might otherwise exist in any names so used, and creates
an estoppel against the assertion of trademark rights." so
The estoppel language speaks more to partial forfeiture than to
total abandonment, suggesting that as between the parties the licensor
has lost the right to exclude the licensee from using the mark in the
geographic or product markets covered by the license. The court's
formal statement of holding-"The court holds that . . . Robinson
Company has abandoned its trademark and lost its exclusive rights
thereto . . . ."-is similarly ambiguous, susceptible to both a partial
forfeiture (by emphasizing "exclusive") and a total forfeiture (by
emphasizing "abandoned") construction.
78 The cases most useful as authority for the proposition that uncontrolled licensing
need not lead to total forfeiture are: E. F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co.,
136 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 763 (1944) (tarnished by holding
that licensee who succeeded in part to licensor's mark rights was estopped by contract
to assert full succession, which leaves open interpretation that licensor itself succeeded
in part to rights which it earlier lost in full) ; Checker Cab Mfg. Co. v. Green Cab
Co., 35 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1931) (tarnished by the absence of any formal licensing
arrangement which makes available a concurrent user analysis to explain the case) ;
MacMahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468 (8th Cir. 1901)
(tarnished by court's analysis of transfer as an invalid assignment rather than an
uncontrolled license) ; and Broeg v. Duchaine, 319 Mass. 711, 67 N.E.2d 466 (1946)
(tarnished by court's use of unclean hands analysis).
The cases which announce a broad rule that uncontrolled licensing leads to
"abandonment" and which on their facts show conduct amounting to total, rather
than partial, forfeiture are: Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, 3 F.2d
27 (8th Cir. 1924); American Junior Aircraft Co. v. L. M. Cox Mfg. Co., 46 TRADE-
mARK REP. 62 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Midwest Fur Producers Ass'n v. Mutation Mink
Breeders Ass'n, 127 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Wis. 1954); Tanner-Brice Co. v. Sims,
174 Ga. 13 (Super. Ct. 1931).
The three cases most difficult to reconcile with the proposition that uncontrolled
licensing need not lead to total forfeiture are: Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research
& Dev. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Ark. 1967); Lea v. New Home Sewing
Mach. Co., 139 F. 732 (E.D.N.Y. 1905); Ritz Associates, Inc. v. Ritz-Carlton Co.,
35 Misc. 2d 426, 134 U.S.P.Q. 86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 138 U.S.P.Q. 404
(App. Div. 1963), aff'd, 141 U.S.P.Q. 757 (Ct. App. 1964). But they can be recon-
ciled: Robinson Co., by arguing a total forfeiture in fact; Lea, by emphasizing that
the case turned on a faulty pleading; and Ritz-Carlton, by emphasizing the importance
to the result of the stipulation of no likelihood of confusion.
79 264 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
so Id. at 863.
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The Midwest Fur Producers case is, in addition, a poor precedent
to rely on for a rule requiring total forfeiture in all cases, involving, as
it did, marks which were expressly held to be generic terms not open
to appropriation as marks or names and a "licensing" system so open
and uncontrolled as to call for a total forfeiture disposition, even under
procedures recognizing the possibility of partial forfeiture. And, as
occurs so often, the case misusing the Midwest Fur Producers case-
the Robinson Co. case-is itself a poor precedent for a total forfeiture
rule, both because the recognition of the putative infringer's defense of
forfeiture through an uncontrolled license was preceded by a holding
of non-infringement by reason of non-likelihood of confusion, and
because the scope of the licensee's uncontrolled use of the mark was
apparently at least co-extensive with the area in which the licensor had
used the mark.8'
VI
Trademark policy countenances trademark licensing provided that
a single mark does not designate products or services of different
systems of quality control in a single market. Trademark policy re-
quires that insofar as independent firms make use of the same mark
at the same time in the same product and geographic market, they
behave interdependently in matters of quality control.
At the minimum, a licensee must depend upon the licensor to
determine product or service specifications as well as a standard of
acceptable conformance to basic specifications. Probably the licensee
also must cede to the licensor the right to conduct sampling and in-
spection operations in the licensee's plant, as well as a power to decide
if particular non-conforming items will be marketed under the mark.
While the public interest requires that licensees follow the dictates
of the licensor regarding specifications, even greater dependence of
licensees upon licensors could be useful to consumers. From a mark
conscious consumer's point of view, the more centralized the decision
making power regarding the nature or quality of goods or services
bearing a particular mark, the better.
81 The mark owner was a jobber with headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. Prob-
ably the mark owner used the mark in an area less than the fifty states. The licensee
was a manufacturer who was producing a lure. Id. at 864. Although the licensee's
production and distribution figures are not reported, such information is given for
the licensee's chief rival (the defendant in the case), and suggests that the licensee
was probably using the mark in all areas of the United States. If these deductions
are correct, no area of the country remains which can be said to be unaffected by
the licensor's conduct. Since the licensed use involved a fishing lure and since the
licensor's mark rights covered the category of fishing tackle and nothing more, no
product market remains which can be said to be unaffected by the licensor's conduct.
Accordingly, total forfeiture of the licensor's mark rights is an appropriate disposition
of the case, and language in the case which suggests that total forfeiture is appropriate
regardless of the magnitude and scope of the licensor's dereliction necessarily loses
much of its weight.
1968]
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Thus, if a group of bedding manufacturers form a company to
own and license the use of a mark to members of the group, mattress
buyers using the mark as a guide to purchasing decisions would prefer
that all mattresses bearing the mark be made of materials from the
same sources, be made by laborers having the same skills, be made with
the same type of equipment and be identically priced.' Similarly, if a
food retailer licenses his mark to other retailers, consumers using the
licensor's identifying symbol would undoubtedly prefer that each
licensee serve the same foods, of the same quality, in the same quantity
and at the same price and, to those ends, use the same kind of equipment
and the same methods of preparation. Consumers might find it addi-
tionally convenient if each licensee did business in a building identical
in design and decor to the buildings of the licensor and the other
licensees.'
But as independent licensee firms contract away to licensors their
autonomy in choosing suppliers, hiring and training employees, buying
equipment, selecting customers, disposing of products and choosing
methods of selling, pricing and advertising, they begin to transgress
upon basic principles of the federal antitrust laws, which are held to
be premised on the notion that independent firms must act independ-
ently, each firm determining for itself from whom it will buy, what
it will produce, at what terms and to whom it will sell.
Trademark policy does not, of course, require licensing. While
it might be that the existence of the option of mark licensing assures
that consumers are confronted with a few less marks at any time than
would be the case if licensing were not a possibility, still it is difficult
to assume that any substantial harm would accrue to consumers, from
a trademark point of view, if licensing were declared to be unacceptable
arrangements under the antitrust laws. Certainly nothing in trademark
philosophy undermines an antitrust policy which disables existing
competitive units from forming a jointly owned firm to hold and
license mark rights to the group, but which permits a licensor to induce
new firms to enter the market as franchisees of existing mark rights.
Trademark policy does of course require that if licensing is per-
mitted, a licensing firm control the quality of its licensee's production by
setting specifications and performance standards and by sampling the
licensee's production at the licensee's place of business. While this
articulation of trademark requirements suggests, and indeed the con-
sumer interest requires, that mark owners have to do more in the
8S2See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 146 U.S.P.Q. 6 (N.D. Ill. 1964), rev'd,
388 U.S. 350 (1967) ; Denison Mattress Factory v. The Spring Air Co., 308 F,2d 403
(5th Cir. 1962).83 See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Engbrecht v. Dairy
Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962).
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way of quality control to assure licensee compliance with standards
than many trademark lawyers presently counsel, it in no way suggests
that mark owners must require that licensees obtain raw materials or
equipment from designated sources or market output at designated
prices in designated surroundings using designated techniques.
If developing antitrust policy approves of a trademark licensing
arrangement requiring a licensee to deal exclusively in designated
items, or requiring a licensee to deal with a particular source, or re-
quiring a licensee to buy a particular item, or confining a licensee to a
particular territory or location, trademark policy will be neither fur-
thered nor offended; the lawfulness of such restrictions on trademark
licensees thus appears to be purely an antitrust matter.
